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Pursuant to Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Court certified sua sponte a question of law arising in two cases before it. 
Rule 41 states as follows: 
(a) Authorization to answer questions of law. The Utah Supreme Court may 
answer a question of Utah law certified to it by a court of the United States 
when requested to do so by such certifying court acting in accordance with the 
provisions of this rule if the state of the law of Utah applicable to a proceeding 
before the certifying court is uncertain. 
Utah R. App. Proc. Rule 41. 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD FOR 
APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issue presented by Debtors' cases is whether funds transferred directly from 
one exempt account as described in Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(a)(x), to another 
exempt account within one year before a debtor files a petition for bankruptcy constitute 
"amounts contributed" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(1 )(b)(ii)Error! 
Bookmark not defined. l. This issue was raised by Debtor Rockwell in her 
Memorandum in Opposition to Trustee's Objection to Exemption and Motion for 
Turnover (Docket, No. 13) and was argued at a motion hearing before the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Court hearing on March 24, 2003. 
Legal questions certified pursuant to Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure present pure questions of law for this Court's consideration. Utah R. App. 
Proc. Rule 41(a) ("The Utah Supreme Court may answer a question of law certified to it 
by a court of the United States . . . . " (emphasis added)). By definition, the issues 
presented are legal questions of first impression. Id. § 41(c)(1)(C) (questions certified by 
a U.S. court must state "there appears to be no controlling Utah law.55). As a pure 
question of law presented to this Court by a court with no special authority as to Utah 
State law, this Court owes the U.S. Bankruptcy Court no deference in answering the legal 
question certified. See In re: Westside Property Assoc, 2000 UT 85, 13 P.3d 168, 170-
171 (discussing authority of State Supreme Courts to rephrase certified questions). 
Consequently, the appropriate standard of review in this case is the familiar standard 
1
 All further references are to Utah Code Ann. (1953) unless otherwise noted. 
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applicable to legal determinations, meaning this court should "decide[] the matter for 
itself and [ ] not defer in any degree . . ." to a court with lesser authority regarding Utah 
State law. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994), abrogation of other holding 
recognized in State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89, 65 P.3d 1134. "[Appellate 
courts have traditionally been seen as having the power and duty to say what the law is 
and to ensure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction." Pena at 936 (citation 
omitted). The interpretation of statutes is a question of law analyzed on the basis of 
correctness. See, e.g., State v. Lowder, 889 P.2d412, 413 (Utah 1994) and State v. 
Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993). 
UTAH STATE STATUTES 
Determinative in this appeal is interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-
5(l)(b)(ii) which states as follows: 
(b) The exemption granted by Subsection (l)(a)(x) does not 
apply to: . . . 
ii. amounts contributed or benefits accrued by or on behalf of a 
debtor within one year before the debtor files for bankruptcy. 
The question of unsettled law certified to this Court is as follows: 
"Whether funds transferred directly from one exempt account, as described in 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(1 )(a)(x), to another exempt account within one year before a 
debtor files bankruptcy constitute 'amounts contributed5 within the meaning of Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-23-5(1 )(b)(ii)." 
Also relevant to this Court's analysis is Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(1 )(a)(x), which 
states as follows: 
3 
(x) [e]xcept as provided in Subsection (l)(b), any money or other 
assets held for or payable to the individual as a participant or 
beneficiary from or an interest of the individual as a participant or 
beneficiary in a retirement plan or arrangement that is described in 
Section 401(a), 401(h), 401(k), 403(a), 403(b), 408, 408A, 409, 
414(d), or 414(e) of the United States Internal Revenue Code of 
1986, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Debtor Rockwell filed a Petition for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Court on December 31, 2002 (Joint Order Certifying Question to the Supreme Court, p. 
3). Six months earlier, she had been laid off from her job at Moore North American, Inc. 
("Moore") in Cache County, State of Utah Id at 3. During her tenure with Moore, 
Debtor had contributed to a Retirement Income Plan ("Retirement Plan"), which was 
worth approximately $6,352.06 upon her termination. Id. at 3. Neither Debtor nor her 
employer had made any contributions to the Retirement Plan within two years of her 
termination. Id. at 3 and 4. She was required by Moore to make an election as to the 
proceeds and chose a lump-sum payment which she directed be rolled over to a Pacific 
Life Insurance Company ("Pacific Life") IRA. Id. at 4. The rollover occurred on 
December 27, 2002 when Moore dispensed the funds directly to Pacific Life by check. 
Id at 4. Debtor Rockwell was never in possession of the funds. Id. at 4. 
Debtor claimed an exemption for the funds under Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(a)(x) and 
the Trustee objected to the claim for exemption. Id page 4. The matter was heard on the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Court's Law and Motion calendar on March 24, 2003. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Where there is no ambiguity in the statute, the rules of statutory construction 
require that the court look at the plain meaning of the statute. The common 
definition and understanding of "contribution" does not include a rollover. 
2. Where the statute looks to technical definitions in one section and uses a common 
word, in another, it must be assumed that the Legislature knew what it was doing 
and did not intend to include the technical definition. 
3. To hold that a mandatory rollover is a contribution and hence not exempt, defeats 
the purpose of the statutory scheme set forth at Utah Code Ann. § 78- 23-1, et seq., 
which allows a debtor to claim as exempt all retirement funds so long as they are 
in a qualifying plan. It does not provide proper notice to a Debtor contemplating 
bankruptcy and thus is impermissibly vague. 
4. When read as a whole, the purpose of the Utah Exemptions Act is remedial and 
should be construed in favor of the debtor. The Utah Exemptions Act allows a 
debtor to conserve and protect a few assets to begin over after creditor or 
bankruptcy action. To exclude rollover contributions from exemption in all cases 




THE TERM "CONTRIBUTED" SHOULD BE INTERPRETED IN LIGHT OF ITS 
PLAIN MEANING 
When interpreting a statute, the court first looks to the plain language of the statute 
and assumes that each term was used advisedly by the Legislature. Biddle v. Washington 
Terrace City, 1999 UT 110,1f 14, 993 P.2d 875, 879. See, also, Hercules, Inc. v. Utah 
State Tax Common, 2000 UT App 372, f 9,21 P.3d 231. Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-
5(b)(ii) provides that no exception shall be granted a debtor for monies in certain 
retirement funds (enumerated in Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(a)(x) if those funds consist of 
"amounts contributed . . . within one year before the debtor files for bankruptcy." The 
language in subparagraph (b)(ii) is clear and no qualifying terms are added to 
"contributed" to expand or limit its definition. Thus, the Court should use the common 
meaning to interpret the term and not look outside the statute for interpretation. See, 
Singer, Statutes And Statutory Construction, § 46:01 (6th ed. 2000). 
In its most ordinary sense, the word contributed means to "give or supply in 
common with others; give to a common fund or for a common purpose." The American 
Heritage Dictionary Of The English Language, p. 400 (4th ed. 2000). See also Black's 
Law Dictionary p. 329 (7th ed. 1999). In contrast, the term "rollover" refers to " the 
transfer of funds (such as IRA funds) into a new investment of the same type especially 
so as to defer payment of taxes." Black's Law Dictionary p. 1329 (7th ed. 1999). Thus, a 
contribution is something done as an initial matter while a rollover is something done 
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subsequent to the contribution, involving no further contribution of money. That is 
certainly the common understanding of these words, and the interpretation that would 
provide for reasonable certainty regarding what can and cannot be done if one expects to 
be able to claim an exemption from execution of retirement plan money or assets 
pursuant to section 78-23-5(1 )(a)(x) of the Utah Code. The plain meaning of 
"contributed" does not include or even suggest a rollover. 
Furthermore, interpreting the word "contributed" to also include a "rollover" is 
unnecessary for meeting the intent of the statute. Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(b)(ii) is 
clearly intended to stop people from using retirement accounts funded immediately prior 
to the filing of the bankruptcy creating a third party interest in the funds as a shelter for 
that money that is exempt from execution. When monies are rolled over to another 
retirement account no new monies are being sheltered from execution; funds already 
exempt from execution are simply placed under the management of a new fiduciary. 
Thus, a rollover is merely a change in form only. That is especially true when, as here, 
no contributions had been made by Ms. Rockwell, or anyone else, for two years prior to 
her filing for bankruptcy. 
Additionally, Rockwell never had possession of the funds as they were sent directly by 
the employer to her IRA fiduciary. 
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II. 
THE LEGISLATURE'S USE OF A TECHNICAL TERM IN ANOTHER SECTION OF 
THE CODE SECTION SUPPORTS THE VIEW THAT THE WORD "CONTRIBUTED" 
WAS NOT INTENDED TO INCLUDE A "ROLLOVER" 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(b) sets forth exceptions to the grant of exemptions in 
Subsection (l)(a)(x): 
(i) an alternate payee under a qualified domestic relations order, as 
those terms are defined in Section 414(p) of the United States 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended; or 
(ii) amounts contributed or benefits accrued by or on behalf of a debtor 
within one year before the debtor files for bankruptcy. 
The Legislature chose to use a technical term concerning a qualified domestic 
relations order in subsection (i) (going so fair as to reference a specific statutory 
definition), but did not use a technical term or qualification of the term "contributed" in 
subsection (ii). It is thus appropriate to apply the maxim of statutory construction, 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, (it is significant when a thing is provided in one part 
and not in another). Further, all omissions should be understood as exclusions. See, 
Singer, Statutes And Statutory Construction, § 47:23 (6th ed. 2000) (citations omitted). 
Consequently, the failure to list the specific technical term "rollover" in Utah Code Ann. 
§ (l)(a)(x)(ii) should be interpreted as an intentional exclusion by the Legislature. 
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III. 
INTERPRETING THE TERM "CONTRIBUTED" TO INCLUDE A ROLLOVER 
RENDERS THE STATUTE IMPERMISSIBLY VAGUE 
Here, the Trustee argues that the word "contributed" in section 78-23-5(b)(ii) of 
Utah's property exemption statute should be interpreted to include a "rollover" of an 
existing exempt retirement account into another like retirement account. To interpret 
"contributed" in such a way as to include a "rollover" would violate the due process 
clauses of the Utah and U.S. Constitutions because such a view would render the word 
"contributed" so vague as to not provide notice of the proscribed conduct. This is 
especially true where, as here, there is little or no choice but for a person to make the 
rollover so as to avoid loosing their retirement, and the person making the rollover never 
handles the money at issue. This Court should avoid interpreting the word "contributed" 
in such a way, especially when such is not necessary to give full effect to the intent of the 
statute at issue here. 
"Vagueness questions are essentially procedural due process issues, i.e., whether 
the statute adequately notices the proscribed conduct." State of Utah v. Morrison, 2001 
UT 73, 31 P.3d 547, 553 (citations and quotations omitted). To pass constitutional 
scrutiny, a statute must be "sufficiently explicit to inform the ordinary reader what 
conduct is prohibited." Id. An undefined statutory term must have a "common 
understanding that is sufficient to put people on warning of what conduct is prohibited by 
the statute," which makes the word or term subject to being "construed with reasonable 
9 
certainty;' Id. If the word "contributed" in Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(b)(ii) were 
interpreted to also include a "rollover" this standard would not be met, and the statute 
would be rendered impermissibly vague. 
Since interpreting the word "contributed" in Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(b)(ii) to 
include a "rollover" would create vagueness as to what conduct is proscribed, and such is 
not needed to meet the intent of the statute, this Court should reject such an interpretation 
so as meet the notions of fair play and substantial justice that underlie the due process 
clauses of the Utah and U.S. Constitutions. 
IV. 
THE UTAH EXEMPTIONS ACT WHEN READ AS A WHOLE DOES NOT FAVOR 
THE INTERPRETATION OF CONTRIBUTION TO INCLUDE ROLLOVER AS A 
MATTER OF FAIRNESS 
The Utah Exemptions Act was passed in 1953 to protect debtors from the harsh 
results of creditor actions. It allows a debtor to exempt or protect certain assets necessary 
for continuation of his or her personal affairs after the action. Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-
2(3) defines "exempt" as "protected", and 'exemption5 means protection from subjection 
to a judicial process to collect an unsecured debt." Thus, for example, a debtor is 
granted an exemption for a homestead (Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-3); a burial plot (Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-23-5(1 )(a)(i)Error! Bookmark not defined., "sofas, chairs, and related 
furnishings reasonably necessary for one household" (with a value up to $500)(Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-23-8(1 )(a)). Debtors are also allowed to exempt retirement benefits they 
have accrued more than one year before filing for bankruptcy to assist them in having 
10 
some security after the filing of a bankruptcy or after creditor action by virtue of the code 
sections here at issue. (Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(a)(x). 
The general rule is that exemption statutes should be liberally construed in favor 
of the debtor to protect the debtor and his or her family. See, Russell M. Miller Co. v. 
Givan, 7 Utah 2d 380? 325 P.2d 908 (1958); Folsom v Asper. 25 Utah 299, 71 P. 315 
(1903); In re Mower's Estate, 93 Utah 390, 73 P.2d 967 (1937). Applying that rule 
favors a plain meaning interpretation of the term "contributed". Some debtors, like 
Appellant ROCKWELL herein, are required to rollover their retirement funds after being 
laid off from their jobs. Requiring these individuals to forfeit their retirement funds is to 
penalize them at a time when they most need assistance. This result is clearly contrary to 
public policy. 
The terms of a statute are to be interpreted as a whole and not in piecemeal 
fashion. Morton Int'l Inc. v. Auditing Div. Of Utah State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 
581, 591 (Utah 1991). In so doing, the court should conclude that the intent of the Utah 
Exemptions Act was to allow debtors to retain retirement funds so long as those funds did 
not come into existence one year before filing of bankruptcy. 
CONCLUSION 
The term "contributed" in Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(b)(ii) should be interpreted 
in its plain meaning and the Court should not expand its meaning to include a "rollover." 
To do so, would make the statute impermissibly vague and would violate public policy. 
11 
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ADDENDUM A 
UTAH EXEMPTIONS ACT 
(Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-1, etseq. 
13 
Chapter 23 
Utah Exemptions Act 
78-23-1 Short Title 
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Exemptions Act." 
78-23-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Debt" means a legally enforceable monetary obligation or liability of 
an individual, whether arising out of contract, tort, or otherwise. 
(2) "Dependent" means the spouse of an individual, and the grandchild or 
the natural or adoptive child of an individual who derives support primarily from 
that individual. 
(3) "Exempt" means protected, and "exemption" means protection from 
subjection to a judicial process to collect an unsecured debt. 
(4) "Judicial lien" means a lien on property obtained by judgment or other 
legal process instituted for the purpose of collecting an unsecured debt. 
(5) "Levy" means the seizure of property pursuant to any legal process 
issued for the purpose of collecting an unsecured debt. 
(6) "Lien" means a judicial, or statutory lien, in property securing payment 
of a debt or performance of an obligation. 
(7) "Liquid assets" means deposits, securities, notes, drafts, unpaid earnings 
not otherwise exempt, accrued vacation pay, refunds, prepayments, and other 
receivables. 
1 
(8) "Security interest" means an interest in property created by contract to 
secure payment or performance of an obligation. 
(9) "Statutory lien" means a lien arising by force of a statute, but does not 
include a security interest or a judicial lien. 
(10) "Value" means fair market value of an individual's interest in property, 
exclusive of valid liens. 
78-23-3. Homestead exemption - Definitions - Excepted obligations - Water rights 
and interests - Conveyance - Sale and disposition - Property right for federal tax 
purposes. 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "household" means a group of persons related by blood or marriage 
living together in the same dwelling as an economic unit, sharing furnishings, 
facilities, accommodations, and expenses; 
(b) "primary personal residence" means a dwelling or mobile home and the 
land surrounding it, not exceeding one acre, as is reasonably necessary for the use 
of the dwelling or mobile home, in which the individual and the individual's 
household reside; and 
(c) "property" means: 
(i) a primary personal residence; 
(ii) real property; or 
(iii) an equitable interest in real property awarded to a person in a 
divorce decree by a court. 
2 
(2) (a) An individual is entitled to a homestead exemption consisting of 
property in this state in an amount not exceeding: 
(i) $5,000 in value if the property consists in whole or in part of 
property which is not the primary personal residence of the individual; or 
(ii) $20,000 in value if the property claimed is the primary personal 
residence of the individual. 
(b) If the property claimed as exempt is jointly owned, each joint owner is 
entitled to a homestead exemption; however 
(i) for property exempt under Subsection (2)(a)(i), the maximum 
exemption may not exceed $10,000 per household; or 
(ii) for property exempt under Subsection (2)(a)(ii), the maximum 
exemption may not exceed $40,000 per household. 
(c) A person may claim a homestead exemption in one or more parcels of 
real property together with appurtenances and improvements. 
(3) A homestead is exempt from judicial lien and from levy, execution, or forced 
sale except for: 
(a) statutory liens for property taxes and assessments on the property; 
(b) security interests in the property and judicial liens for debts created for 
the purchase price of the property; 
(c) judicial liens obtained on debts created by failure to provide support or 
maintenance for dependent children; and 
(d) consensual liens obtained on debts created by mutual contract. 
3 
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b), water rights and interests, 
either in the form of corporate stock or otherwise, owned by the homestead claimant are 
exempt from execution to the extent that those rights and interests are necessarily 
employed in supplying water to the homestead for domestic and irrigating purposes. 
(b) Those water rights and interests are not exempt from calls or 
assessments and sale by the corporations issuing the stock. 
(5) (a) When a homestead is conveyed by the owner of the property, the 
conveyance may not subject the property to any lien to which it would not be subject in 
the hands of the owner. 
(b) The proceeds of any sale, to the amount of the exemption existing at the 
time of sale, is exempt from levy, execution, or other process for one year after the 
receipt of the proceeds by the person entitled to the exemption. 
(6) The sale and disposition of one homestead does not prevent the selection or 
purchase of another. 
(7) For purposes of any claim or action for taxes brought by the United States 
Internal Revenue Service, a homestead exemption claimed on real property in this state is 
considered to be a property right. 
78-23-4. Declaration of homestead - Filing - Contents - Failure to file - Conveyance 
by married person - No execution sale if bid less than exemption - Redemption 
rights of judgment creditor. 
An individual may select and claim a homestead by complying with the following 
requirements: 
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(1) Filing a signed and acknowledged declaration of homestead with the recorder 
of the county or counties in which the homestead claimant's property is located or serving 
a signed and acknowledged declaration of homestead upon the sheriff or other officer 
conducting an execution prior to the time stated in the notice of such execution. 
(2) The declaration of homestead shall contain: 
(a) a statement that the claimant is entitled to an exemption and if the 
claimant is married a statement that the claimant's spouse has not filed a 
declaration of homestead; 
(b) a description of the property subject to the homestead; 
(c) an estimate of the cash value of such property; and 
(d) a statement specifying the amount of the homestead claimed and stating 
the name, age, and address of any spouse and dependents claimed to determine the 
value of the homestead. 
(3) If a declaration of homestead is not filed or served as provided in this section, 
title shall pass to the purchaser upon execution free and clear of all homestead rights. 
(4) If an individual is married, no conveyance of or security interest in, or contract 
to convey or create a security interest in property recorded as a homestead prior to the 
time of such conveyance, security interest, or contract shall be valid, unless both the 
husband and wife join in the execution of the conveyance, security interest, or contract. 
(5) Property that includes a homestead shall not be sold at execution if there is no 
bid which exceeds the amount of the declared homestead exemption. 
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(6) If property that includes a homestead is sold under execution the sale shall be 
subject to redemption by the judgment debtor as provided in Rule 69(f) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. If there is a deficiency the property shall not be subject to another 
execution to cover the deficiency. 
78-23-5, Property exempt from execution. 
(1) (a) An individual is entitled to exemption of the following property: 
(i) a burial plot for the individual and his family; 
(ii) health aids reasonably necessary to enable the individual or a dependent 
to work or sustain health; 
(iii) benefits the individual or his dependent have received or are entitled to 
receive because of disability, illness, or unemployment from any source; 
(iv) benefits paid or payable for medical, surgical, or hospital care to the 
extent they are used by an individual or his dependent to pay for that care; 
(v) veterans benefits; 
(vi) money or property received, and rights to receive money or property 
for child support; 
(vii) one clothes washer and dryer, one refrigerator, one freezer, one stove, 
one microwave oven, one sewing machine, all carpets in use, provisions sufficient 
for 12 months actually provided for individual or family use, all wearing apparel 
of every individual and dependent, not including jewelry or furs, and all beds and 
bedding for every individual or dependent; 
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(viii) works of art depicting the debtor or the debtor and his resident family, 
or produced by the debtor or the debtor and his resident family, except works of 
art held by the debtor as part of a trade or business; 
(ix) proceeds of insurance, a judgment, or a settlement, or other rights 
accruing as a result of bodily injury of the individual or of the wrongful death or 
bodily injury of another individual of whom the individual was or is a dependent 
to the extent that those proceeds are compensatory; 
(x) except as provided in Subsection (l)(b), any money or other assets held 
for or payable to the individual as a participant or beneficiary from or an interest 
of the individual as a participant or beneficiary in a retirement plan or arrangement 
that is described in Section 401(a), 401(h), 401(k), 403(a), 403(b), 408, 408A, 409, 
414(d), or 414(e) of the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as 
amended; and 
(xi) the interest of or any money or other assets payable to an alternate 
payee under a qualified domestic relations order as those terms are defined in 
Section 414(p) of the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, 
(b) The exemption granted by Subsection (l)(a)(x) does not apply to: 
(i) an alternate payee under a qualified domestic relations order, as those 
terms are defined in Section 414(p) of the United States Internal Revenue Code of 
1986, as amended; or 
(ii) amounts contributed or benefits accrued by or on behalf of a debtor 
within one year before the debtor files for bankruptcy. 
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(2) Exemptions under this section do not limit items which may be claimed as 
exempt under Section 78-23-8. 
78-23-6. Property exempt from execution to extent necessary for support 
Besides the property specified in Section 78-23-5, an individual is entitled to 
exemption of the following property to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of 
the individual and his dependents: 
(1) money or property received, and rights to receive money or property for 
alimony or separate maintenance; 
(2) proceeds or benefits paid or payable on the death of an insured, if the 
individual was the spouse or a dependent of the insured; and 
(3) assets held, payments, and amounts payable under a stock bonus, pension, 
profit-sharing, annuity, or similar plan providing benefits other than by reason of illness 
or disability. 
78-23-7, Exemption of unmatured life insurance contracts. 
Except as provided in this section, an individual is entitled to an exemption of 
unmatured life insurance contracts owned by him. If the contracts have accrued dividends 
and loan values totaling more than $5,000 available to the individual, a judgment creditor 
may obtain a court order directing the individual debtor to pay the creditor, and 
authorizing the creditor on the debtor's behalf to obtain payment of, the amount of the 
accrued dividends and loan values exceeding $5,000 or the amount of the creditor's 
claim, whichever is less. 
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78-23-8. Value of exempt property - Exemption of implements, professional 
books, tools, and motor vehicle. 
(1) An individual is entitled to exemption of the following property up to an 
aggregate value of items in each subsection of $500: 
(a) sofas, chairs, and related furnishings reasonably necessary for one 
household; 
(b) dining and kitchen tables and chairs reasonably necessary for one 
household; 
(c) animals, books, and musical instruments, if reasonably held for the 
personal use of the individual or his dependents; and 
(d) heirlooms or other items of particular sentimental value to the 
individual. 
(2) An individual is entitled to an exemption, not exceeding $3,500 in aggregate 
value, of implements, professional books, or tools of his trade. 
(3) (a) As used in this Subsection (3), "motor vehicle" does not include any motor 
vehicle designed for or used primarily for recreational purposes, such as: 
(i) an off-highway vehicle as defined in Section 41-22-2, except a 
motorcycle the individual regularly uses for daily transportation; or 
(ii) a recreational vehicle as defined in Section 13-14-102, except a van the 
individual regularly uses for daily transportation. 
(b) An individual is entitled to an exemption, not exceeding $2,500 in value, of 
one motor vehicle. 
(4) This section does not affect property exempt under Section 78-23-5. 
78-23-9. Exemption of proceeds from property sold, taken by condemnation, lost, 
damaged, or destroyed - Tracing exempt property and proceeds. 
(1) If property, or a part thereof, that could have been claimed exempt under 
Subsection 78-23-5(l)(a)(i) or (ii), or personal property subject to a value limitation 
under Subsection 78-23-8(1 )(a), (b), or (c) has been sold or taken by condemnation, or 
has been lost, damaged, or destroyed and the owner has been compensated therefore, the 
individual is entitled to an exemption of proceeds that are traceable for one year after the 
proceeds are received. The exemption of proceeds under this subsection does not entitle 
the individual to claim an aggregate exemption in excess of the value limitation otherwise 
allowable under Section 78-23-3 or 78-23-8. 
(2) Money or other property exempt under Subsection 78-23-5(1 )(a)(iii), (iv), (v), 
or (vi), or exempt to the extent reasonably necessary for support under Section 78-23-6, 
remains exempt after its receipt by, and while it is in the possession of, the individual or 
in any other form into which it is traceable. 
(3) Money or other property and proceeds exempt under this chapter are traceable 
under this section by application of the principle of first-in first-out, last-in last-out, or 
any other reasonable basis for tracing selected by the individual. 
78-23-10. Allowable claims against exempt property. 
(1) Notwithstanding other provisions of this chapter, but subject to the provisions 
of the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code: 
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(a) A creditor may levy against exempt property of any kind to enforce a claim 
for: 
(i) alimony, support, or maintenance; 
(ii) unpaid earnings of up to one month's compensation or the full-time 
equivalent of one month's compensation for personal services of an employee; or 
(iii) state or local taxes. 
(b) A creditor may levy against exempt property to enforce a claim for: 
(i) the purchase price of the property or a loan made for the purpose of 
enabling an individual to purchase the specific property used for that purpose; 
(ii) labor or materials furnished to make, repair, improve, preserve, store, or 
transport the specific property; and 
(iii) a special assessment imposed to defray costs of a public improvement 
benefiting the property. 
(2) This section does not affect the right to enforce any statutory lien or security 
interest in exempt property. 
78-23-11. Waiver of exemptions in favor of unsecured creditor unenforceable. 
A waiver of exemptions executed in favor of an unsecured creditor before levy on 
an individual's property is unenforceable. 
78-23-12. Assertion of individual's rights by spouse, dependent or other authorized 
person. 
If an individual fails to select property entitled to be claimed as exempt or to 
object to a levy on the property or to assert any other right under this chapter, the spouse 
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or a dependent of the individual or any other authorized person may make the claim or 
objection or assert the rights provided by this chapter. 
78-23-13. Injunctive relief, damages, or both allowed against creditor to prevent 
violation of chapter - Costs and attorney's fees. 
An individual or the spouse or a dependent of the individual is entitled to 
injunctive relief, damages, or both, against a creditor or other person to prevent or redress 
a violation of this chapter. A court may award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to a 
party entitled to injunctive relief or damages. 
78-23-14. Property held by joint tenants or tenants in common. 
If an individual and another own property in this state as joint tenants or tenants in 
common, a creditor of the individual, subject to the individual's right to claim an 
exemption under this chapter, may obtain a levy on and sale of the interest of the 
individual in the property. A creditor who has obtained a levy, or a purchaser who has 
purchased the individual's interest at the sale, may have the property partitioned or the 
individual's interest severed. 
78-23-15. Exemption provisions applicable in bankruptcy proceedings. 
No individual may exempt from the property of the estate in any bankruptcy 
proceeding the property specified in Subsection (d) of Section 522 of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act (Public Law 95-598), except as may otherwise be expressly permitted under 
this chapter. 
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